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Overview of Space Station Freedom 
Avionics Design for Critical Functions
John Rush
NASA Space Station Freedom Program Office 
Rest on, Virginia
Space Station Freedom will be an 
orbiting laboratory facility 
resulting from a major investment by 
the United States and its 
International Partners. It is 
imperative that Space Station 
Freedom's avionics system be 
designed to be robust and capable of 
performing the critical functions 
necessary to protect our investment 
in this unique resource. This paper 
provides an overview of the design 
of the avionics system with regard 
to its resilient failure tolerant 
architecture.
I. Introduction
Space Station Freedom (SSF) will be an orbiting laboratory 
facility that will host a wide range of payloads during its thirty 
year lifetime. Each payload will require some set of facility 
resources and/Or services such as electric power, heat dissipation, 
data services, manned attendance, etc. To provide these resources 
and services, and to maintain SSF as an orbiting manned vehicle, 
SSF will have a set of distributed systems, each providing a 
Specific resource or service function.
In this paper the systems of interest will be those that have 
their functionality controlled by the SSF's avionics computers. 
Those systems and their principle functions are:
1) Electric Power System (EPS): Provides electrical power 
and power distribution to SSF electronic system and 
payload equipment.
2) Guidance, Navigation, and Control/Propulsion (GNCP): 
Provides SSF's attitude determination, attitude control, 
and maintains orbital altitude.
3) Data Management System (DMS): Provides the software
execution, man-machine interface, data storage, and data 
transport resources and services used in the avionics 
system.
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4) Thermal Control System (TCS): Provides heat dissipation 
services for SSF equipment.
5) Communication and Tracking System (CTS): Provides 
spacecraft to ground communication services via the 
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and crew 
video and audio services.
6) Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS): 
Maintains atmosphere in pressurized elements/ controls 
water and waste processing, and provides fire detectipn 
and suppression.
7) Mobile Servicing System (MSS): Provides robotic services 
for maintenance and equipment transport outside of the 
pressurized elements.
8) Payload Executive System (PES) : Provides management ojf 
payload execution.
Each of the above systems perform functions that are needed to 
make SSF an operating laboratory facility. For SSF to perform its 
mission all system provided functions should be available all the 
time. However , although each system's components will be 
designed to a high degree of reliability, there will be times 
during the thirty year mission of SSF when system components will 
fail. A way to enhance the availability of system functionality is 
to implement redundant system components in the design together 
with a mechanism to detect failures and switch in the redundant 
units when necessary. Of course, the addition of multiple redundant 
components adds weight, cost, and complexity to the overall 
spacecraft design. Therefore, the redundant component approach to 
assuring system function availability should be used selectively, 
concentrating on those system functions that are most vital.
II. A Functional Partition Model
The top level system function partitioning model depicted in 
figure 1 partitions the SSF system functions into three groups. The 
partitions are based upon the relative consequences to SSF 
resulting from loss of a system's function. The determination of 
the consequences of the loss of system functionality must consider 
a number of factors:
1) SSF systems are being designed to be maintainable
on-orbit. Thus, system functionality can be restored 
by maintenance action by the crew.
2) Although SSF is being designed to be a permanently 
manned spacecraft, it will spend long periods of time 
in an unmanned state before Permanently Manned 
Capability (PMC) is achieved.
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3) Some of the systems listed above perform functions 
that are vital for the SSF to survive as an orbiting 
spacecraft. Others, though necessary for SSF 
mission success, do not pose immediate catastrophic 
consequences to the spacecraft if the system's 
functional capability were lost.
For example , a loss of the GNCP system would result in the 
inability of the spacecraft to maintain attitude determination and 
control r thus leading to the inability to point solar arrays for 
power generation, point communication antennas for acquisition of 
TDRSS satellites, and place SSF in a stable attitude for shuttle 
docking. During unmanned operations such a function loss would be 
especially critical and could jeopardize station survival, since 
the next maintenance opportunity could be months away. On the other 
hand, loss of the PES system would hamper payload operations and 
endanger mission performance, however, as long as the other SSF 
system functions are being performed the PES could be restored to 
operational status through crew maintenance action at the next 
available opportunity.
A major functional partition in figure 1 is that between 
payload operations and core system functions. The payload operation 
functions are those that are necessary to keep the SSF payload 
compliment running and fully provided with facility services. The 
core system functions are those functions that are needed to keep 
SSF operating as an orbiting manned laboratory.
The core systems can be further partitioned into a set of 
essential functions needed for spacecraft survival and a set of 
spacecraft facility functions that support manned operations. As 
shown in figure 1, the essential system functions needed for 
spacecraft survival include the Electric Power System (EPS) . 
Without electrical power, of course, no avionics function can be 
performed. GNCP system functions are also in the essential 
functions set. Without maintenance of spacecraft attitude it would 
be impossible to point the EPS solar panels correctly, dock the 
orbiter to the station, or to reboost the station to maintain 
orbital altitude. In order to keep the avionics system operating, 
the various avionics components must be kept within their operating 
temperature range. Therefore, the Thermal Control System (TCS) 
function must also be included in the set of spacecraft essential 
functions.
Together, the EPS, GNCP, and TCS systems alone can maintain 
the spacecraft in a stable orbital state for a few days. If the SSF 
were unmanned, in order to maintain a stable state over a longer 
period of time it would be necessary for ground controllers to 
communicate with the operating systems onboard. For example, 
synchronizing reboost activity with orbiter rendezvous plans and 
moving the Station to docking attitude would require ground 
commanding. Therefore, the Communication and Tracking System (CTS) 
must also be added to the set of spacecraft essential functions. 
However, it should be noted that only the S-band functional 
capability of CTS is really needed in this minimum set of survival
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functions. The Data Management System (DMS) is fundamental for any 
avionics function to be performed and therefore must be included in 
the set of spacecraft essential functions also. Those core system 
functions not included in the spacecraft essential function set in 
figure 1 are placed in the set of system functions needed to 
provide important laboratory facility capabilities. Included in the 
spacecraft facility functions are those system functions needed to 
conduct robotic servicing of truss mounted system components and 
the movement of equipment and payloads exterior to the pressurized 
modules. The man critical systems depicted in figure 1 are those 
that maintain the pressure , temperature, humidity, and breathable 
atmosphere aboard SSF and provide the general support services 
needed for manned operations, both inside and outside of the 
pressurized modules,
III. A Channelized Architecture
Each of the core systems is being designed with redundant 
components such that failure of a single component will not 
terminate performance of the system's function. For the systems 
performing spacecraft essential functions there will be triple 
component redundancy so that the system will continue to perform 
its functions even with two component failures.
An additional consideration in the design of SSF systems is 
that all system components depend upon power , data, and thermal 
resources and services. Therefore failures in EPS, DMS, or TCS 
components could propagate throughout other spacecraft systems. In 
order to prevent this from happening the core systems will 
implement a channelized design approach for connectivity of power, 
data, and thermal resources to core system components. In this 
channelized approach each core system has its components connected 
to form fault containment domains that resist propagation of a 
fault from one domain into the others.
A system performing a spacecraft essential function will have 
a minimum of three fault containment domains such that no two 
failures can disable the system from performing its functions, i.e. 
the system is two failure tolerant. The remainder of the core 
system functions, i.e. the spacecraft facility functions in figure 
1, will be channelized into a minimum of two fault containment 
domains each, thus making them one failure tolerant systems.
Figure 2 illustrates how system components will be channelized 
into fault containment domains. In this case the fault containment 
domains for GN&C are depicted for the attitude determination 
function. The attitude determination function requires that the 
GN&C process control computer be connected to at least one Star 
Tracker (ST) or an Inertial Sensor Assembly (ISA). GN&C actually 
has four fault containment domains with respect to its own 
components, data bus connections, and power supplies. With respect 
to thermal services there are three fault containment domains since 
the Moderate Temperature Loop (MTL) of the TCS cools EPS equipment 
for power buses 3 and 4. Thus from the figure 2 diagram it can be
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shown that there is no combination of two failures, either in GN&C 
components or power, data, or thermal connections, that would 
result in loss of the essential attitude determination function.
IV. Failure Protection at the System Control Level
Each of the core systems is controlled by computer programs 
executing in one of four SDPs. Figure 3 depicts the four computers 
and their power, data, and thermal connectivity. In order to 
maintain core system failure tolerance the controlling computers 
must have power, data, and thermal connectivity that is two failure 
tolerant.
There will be eighteen buses used for data connection of core 
system components to the controlling SDPs. Each of the four SDPs 
will be connected to all eighteen data buses therefore allowing any 
of the four SDPs to run any core system's control program.
In order to protect against power failures each SDP will have 
at least two separate sources of power. In addition, three separate 
cooling loops will provide heat dissipation to the four computers.
The net result of the design for the core system control 
computers will be that no two failures of SDPs or their power, 
data, or thermal connections will result in loss of core system 
control processing. Therefore, the design will compliment the 
robust fault containment architecture for the each of the core 
systems.
V. Conclusion
The SSF avionics system design provides a resilient survival 
capability for the spacecraft where essential functions are at 
least two failure tolerant. A channelized architecture includes 
provisions for protection against failures in power, data, and 
thermal resource distribution to system components. The core system 
control computers are designed to assume control of any core system 
and are also protected from failures in power and thermal 
distribution channels.
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